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CONFLICT OF LAWS - FOREIGN TORT - NOT JUSTIFIABLE
BY THE LEX LOCI DELICTI - RESIDENCE OF DEFENDANT -
INTERPROVINCIAL COMITY - JUDICIAL CREATIVITY
J.G. CASTEL*
The conflict of laws rule applicable in foreign tons
contains two conditions. First, the wrong must be
actionable under the law of the forum. Second, the
wrong must not be justifiable by the law of the place
where the tort occurred. Professor Castel welcomes
a recent decision of the Ontario Court of Appealfur-
ther refining the second condition of the rule.
However, he argues that the decision of the Court of
Appeal is actually a disguised attempt to adopt the
doctrine of the proper law of the tort dependent upon
establishing which jurisdiction has the most signifi-
cant relationship with the tort. In his call for reform
Professor Castel drafts a new foreign torts rule with
a proper law of the tort exception that is only to be
applied in special circumstances.
La rdgle du conflit de lois applicable aux delits
etrangers contient deux conditions. Premirement,
le dilit ou quasi-delit doit ouvrir droit d une pour-
suite aux termes de la loi du for. Deuxibmement, le
delit ne doit pas tre defendable par la loi del 'endroit
oih il s 'est produit. Le Professeur Castel se declare
enfaveur d 'une decision recente de la Cour d 'appel
de l'Ontario qui raffine plus avant cette deuxidme con-
dition. l avance nianmoins que la decision de la Cour
d'appel constitue enfait une tentative voilee d 'adopter
la doctrine du droit de la responsabilite civile appli-
cable aprbs avoir etabli quelle autorite legislative
entretient le lien le plus significatif avec le ddlit. Dans
son appel 4 la reforme, le professeur Castel propose
une nouvelle rdgle des delits etrangers contenant une
derogation au droit de la responsabilitJ civile com-
petente qui ne peut s 'appliquer que dans des cir-
constances speciales.
In Grimes v. Cloutier and Cloutier' the Ontario Court of Appeal, in a burst
of judicial creativity, reconsidered the second condition in Phillips v. Eyre2 as
interpreted by Machado v. Fontes3 and applied by the Supreme Court of
Canada in McLean v. Pettigrew.4 The new approach adopted by the Court of
Appeal alleviates some of the shortcomings of the rule in an area where legis-
lative or judicial reform has been long overdue. Before examining Grimes v.
Cloutier and Cloutier, it is proper to review very briefly the general common
law conflict of laws rule applicable to foreign torts which was enunciated by
Willes J. in Phillips v. Eyre more than a century ago:5
"As a general rule, in order to found a suit in England for a wrong alleged to have been
committed abroad, two conditions must be fulfilled. First, the wrong must be of such a charac-
ter that it would have been actionable if committed in England .... Secondly, the act must
not have been justifiable by the law of the place where it was done."
In the common law world, much difference of opinion has arisen with respect
to the interpretation and application of this general rule.
There is a substantial body of judicial opinion which holds that both con-
ditions determine the jurisdiction of the courts over the cause of action, i.e.
foreign torts.' Once they have been met, the lexfori applies to questions of
substance and procedure. The primacy given to the lexfori encourages forum
shopping although it may be controlled by the doctrine of forum non con-
Distinguished Research Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
(1989), 69 O.R. (2d) 641 (C.A.).
(1870), L.R. 6 Q.B. 1.
[18971 2 Q.B. 231 (C.A.).
[1945] S.C.R. 62.
Supra, note 2 at 28-29.
See, for example, Gagnon v. Lecavalier (1967), 63 D.L.R. (2d) 12 at 13.
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veniens. Questions of substance should not be determined by the lexfori in its
domestic sense especially when that law has no connection with the forum. To
interpret the general rule as jurisdictional in nature is not satisfactory as it often
leads to unjust results. This is why, in Canada, most courts have considered
the rule in Phillips v. Eyre to be a true double-barrelled choice of law rule of
the lexfori.7
The first condition of the rule that a wrong must be of such character that
it would have been actionable if committed in England has not given rise to
much controversy. It is a parochial rule that encourages forum shopping and
may lead to injustice. The claim must have arisen in circumstances that if they
had occurred in the forum, a cause of action would have arisen entitling the
plaintiff to enforce against the defendant a civil liability of the kind which the
plaintiff claims to enforce. In other words, civil liability must exist under the
lexfori.
It is with respect to the meaning of the second condition of the rule, i.e. the
act must not have been justifiable by the law of the place where it was done,
that much confusion still exists today due to many divergent interpretations.
The issue is whether something other than civil liability is sufficient to render
an act not justifiable.
In Canada, the Supreme Court has adopted the interpretation given to that
condition by the English Court of Appeal in Machado v. Fontes' that 'not
justifiable' means not legally innocent. Thus, criminal liability is sufficient
to render an act not justifiable even though it does not give rise to any civil
actionability or liability. Machado v. Fontes has been much criticized and was
overruled by a majority of the House of Lords in Chaplin v. Boys9 which held
that the act is not justifiable only if it is civilly actionable under the lex loci
delicti. The concept of civil actionability is also subject to several interpreta-
tions. It could mean a) actionability by the lex loci delicti whether or not
damages can be recovered,' 0 for instance where the act creates a cause of
action but there exists a complete defence which precludes civil liability from
arising orb) some civil liability under the lex loci delicti even though some of
the damages claimed by the plaintiff cannot be recovered under that law, " or
c) civil liability in accordance with the lex loci delicti including the extent of
such liability. Here, the provisions of the lex loci delicti denying, limiting or
qualifying the recovery of damages must be taken into consideration before
determining whether the act is not justifiable by that law. The question is not
whether the act was innocent but whether civil liability existed in respect of
the relevant claim as between the actual parties under the lex loci delicti of the
7. J.G. Castel, Canadian Conflict of Laws (2d ed., 1986), at para. 469, and generally see P. Bates,
"Foreign Torts: The Canadian Choice of Law Rule" (1987) 8 Advocate Q. 397.
8. [1897] 2 Q.B. 231 (C.A.). Lopes and Rigby J.J. considered that the act complained of must not
be "innocent" in the country where it was done and that if the act was contrary in any respect
to the law of that country, though giving rise to no civil liability there, it was not "justifiable"
for the purpose of the second condition. Can. Nat'l SS Co. Ltd. v. Watson, [1939] S.C.R. I1;
McLean v. Pettigrew, supra, note 4.
9. [1971] A.C. 356.
10. Hartley v. Venn (1967), 10 F.L.R. 151 (Australia).
1I. This was the situation in Chaplin v. Boys, supra, note 9.
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kind sought to be imposed under that law. 2 This interpretation is consistent
with the vested rights theory propounded by Willes J. in Phillips v. Eyre. 3
It also achieves the objective of certainty and, in the case of interprovincial
torts, gives recognition to the laws in force at the place of tort. An individual
should not be able to claim in the forum in respect of a matter for which civil
liability does not exist or is excluded under the law of the place where the wrong
was committed.
In Chaplin v. Boys, the House of Lords did not replace the rule in Phillips
v. Eyre by the doctrine of the proper law of a tort.'4 However, Lords Hodson
and Wilberforce introduced that doctrine as an exception in the name of flex-
ibility in order to achieve individual justice in cases where with respect to a
particular issue, the place of tort has little interest in seeing its law applied due
to lack of other proper connections. 5 This exception finds its justification in
the language used by Willes J. in Phillips v. Eyre when he said "[a]s a general
rule". "6 The exception to the general rule should discourage forum shopping.
It does not confer an unfettered judicial discretion away from the lex loci delicti
or the lexfori, enabling the general rule to be ignored in arbitrary fashion, as
there must be a sufficient justification to apply it.
In Canada, the courts are still trying to find ways to escape the clutches of
Machado v. Fontes. Thus, in Grimes v. Cloutier and Cloutier,'7 the respon-
dent, a resident of Ontario, while riding as a passenger in an automobile
registered and insured in Ontario and driven by an Ontario resident, sustained
personal injuries as a result of a collision in Quebec with an automobile
registered and insured in that province driven by the first appellant and owned
by the second appellant, both residents of Quebec. The first appellant had been
found guilty of driving in breach of the Quebec Highway Code'" at the time of
the collision. The respondent had received benefits in full satisfaction of all
amounts payable to her in accordance with the provisions of the Quebec Auto-
mobile Insurance Act, " which as a result of an Agreement between Quebec
and Ontario" were part of the Ontario Standard Automobile Policy.' In addi-
tion, she brought an action for full common law damages in Ontario against
the two Quebec residents in order to obtain more than that which was provided
by the Quebec insurance scheme, which proscribed civil actionability.
12. Lord Wilberforce in Chaplin v. Boys, ibid. at 389. It is the relevant claim as between the actual
parties which must be looked at, and not whether such a claim would in theory be actionable.
Per Dunn L.J. in Armagas Ltd. v. Mundogas S.A., [1986] 1 A.C. 717 at 753 (C.A.); also Goff
L.J. at 740; and Breavington v. Godleman (1988), 62 A.L.J.R. 447 (Australia H.C.).
13. See (1870), L.R. 6 Q.B. 1 at 28.
14. For the proper law of a tort see Restatement of the Law Second, Conflict of Laws (1971), ss. 145-146.
15. Supra, note 9, at 377-378, 380, 391-392.
16. Supra, note 2 at 28-29.
17. Supra, note 1.
18. R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-24, s. 83.
19. L.Q. 1977, c. 68, esp. ss. 4 and 8.
20. Dec. 27, 1978.
21. Insurance Act, R.S.O., 1980, c. 218 as am. by Reg. 1004-78.
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The trial judge found for the respondent as he refused to (distinguish the facts
of this case from those of McLean v. Pettigrew. On appeal, the Ontario Court
of Appeal stated the issue as follows:2" "The substantial issue in this appeal
is whether the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in McLean v. Petti-
grew, [1945] S.C.R. 62, [1945] 2 D.L.R. 65 requires us to uphold the judg-
ment against the appellants notwithstanding that (1) they are Quebec residents,
(2) the accident occurred in the Province of Quebec and, (3) under Quebec law
they are not civilly liable." Although the court was prepared to distinguish
McLean v. Pettigrew on the facts, it was not prepared to give an entirely new
interpretation to the second rule in Phillips v. Eyre or to adopt the doctrine of
the proper law of a tort either as a general rule for foreign torts or as an excep-
tion to Phillips v. Eyre on the ground that: "Whatever weakness there may be
in the interpretative reasoning in Machado v. Fontes, a countervailing consider-
ation should also be noted: as a matter of policy an inflexible rule that the
absence of civil liability in the place where the alleged tort took place is a valid
defence can, in some cases lead to an unjust result." 3
In McLean v. Pettigrew4 the accident occurred in Ontario. The plaintiff
was a gratuitous passenger in the automobile driven and owned by the defen-
dant. Both parties resided in Quebec and the automobile was registered and
insured in that province. If the accident had taken place in Quebec, the defen-
dant would have been liable for the plaintiff's damages whereas in Ontario at
that time drivers and owners could not be liable to a gratuitous passenger. As
the Supreme Court found the tortfeasor to have driven in a careless manner in
breach of the Ontario Highway Traffic Act, the wrong was notjustifiable under
the lex loci delicti and the gratuitous passenger was able to recover her damages.
In the arduous task of distinguishing McLean v. Pettigrew from the facts of
the case under appeal, the court resorted to a variety of arguments some of which
are of a dubious value. First, a review of a number of Canadian decisions which
applied McLean v. Pettigrew enabled the Court of Appeal to conclude that this
case did not preclude the application of the law of Quebec. Although the court
admitted that in the past the residence of the parties may not have been a deci-
sive factor in interpreting the second rule in Phillips v. Eyre, it attached great
importance to the fact that in the case under review the two appellants were resi-
dent in the place where the accident took place whereas this was not so in
McLean v. Pettigrew. Yet, it should be noted that in the latter case, the resi-
dence of all the parties in the place where the action was brought may have been
the decisive factor in allowing recovery by the gratuitous passenger. The Court
of Appeal also relied upon the qualifying clause "[a]s a general rule" used by
Willes J. in Phillips v. Eyre in his statement of the rule to point out that it admits
of exceptions. Since in McLean v. Pettigrew, Taschereau J. also used the prefa-
tory words "[u]nder these conditions", 5 there were good reasons for the
Court of Appeal in the light of other factors not to interpret his judgment as
requiring that the second rule in Phillips v. Eyre be applied in all cases of foreign
22. At 646.
23. At 649.
24. Supra, note 4.
25. Ibid. at 76.
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torts, especially if it would lead to an unjust result as in the case under appeal.
In McLean v. Pettigrew, the result on the facts was ajust one which could also
have been reached by applying the doctrine of the proper law of a tort. In the
present case the accident took place in Quebec where it was covered by the
Quebec automobile compensation scheme. The appellants, as residents of that
province, were legally entitled to the protection of that scheme. It would have
been unjust to submit them to the law of Ontario and destroy their reasonable
expectations of the legal consequences of their conduct. 26 As for the respon-
dent victim, the court stated that it would be difficult to believe that she would
have had any reasonable expectation that Ontario law would apply to the
exclusion of Quebec law with respect to any driving accident occurring in
Quebec. This view, however, emphasizes the place of the accident rather than
the residence of the tortfeasor. Finally, the Court of Appeal added that comity
as between the provinces required one province when applying its laws not to
ignore the policies of another province as expressed in its legislation. Thus, the
court concluded that on the facts of the case it should not apply the "punisha-
ble" gloss of the second rule in Phillips v. Eyre. Since the appellants were not
civilly liable to the respondent forthe accident in Quebec, her claim was held
to fail.27
Today, at least in Ontario, until we hear from the Supreme Court of Canada,
where the defendant resides in the place of the tort, 'not justifiable', in Phil-
lips v. Eyre, means the absence of civil liability, in respect of the relevant claim
as between the actual parties, of the kind sought to be imposed under that law.
It is interesting to note that the Court of Appeal preferred to distinguish
McLean v. Pettigrew rather than to give an entirely new interpretation to the
second rule in Phillips v. Eyre. Thus, Machado v. Fontes remains valid in cer-
tain cases in order to achieve individual justice. Actually, the decision of the
Court of Appeal is a disguised attempt to adopt the doctrine of the proper law
of a tort since the application of the test in McLean v. Pettigrew or the one in
Grimes v. Cloutier and Cloutier depends upon the existence of certain con-
necting factors that indicate which jurisdiction has the most significant rela-
tionship with the occurrence and the parties with respect to a particular issue.
Probably, the court took this approach because it favoured reforming the law
by legislative rather than judicial intervention. In view of previous unsuccessful
attempts to adopt uniform legislation in Canada in this area of the conflict of
laws,2 it would be better for the Supreme Court of Canada to discard the rule
in McLean v. Pettigrew and to adopt the following one:29
26. Note that in Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y. 2d 569 (1969), at 585, the court stated that "when the
driver's conduct occurred in the state of his domicile and that state does not cast him in liability
for that conduct, he should not be held liable by reason of the fact that liability would be im-
posed upon him under the tort law of the state of the victim's domicile."
27. For a recent Australian case involving almost similar facts see Breavington v. Godleman, supra,
note 12, where the claim also failed and comment by H.P. Glenn (1989) 68 Can. Bar Rev. 584.
28. See Proceedings of the Forty-Eighth Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation
in Canada (1966) at 62.
29. Based on formulations by Lords Hodson and Wilberforce in Chaplin v. Boys, supra, note 9, at
380, 391. See also Dicey & Morris, The Conflict of Laws (11th ed., 1987), rule 205, at 1356-66
and Restatement of the Law Second, Conflict of Laws (1971), s. 146.
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As a general rule, an act done in a foreign country is a tort and actionable as such in [Ontario]
only if it is actionable as a tort according to [Ontario] law, subject to the condition that civil
liability in respect of the relevant claim exists as between the actual parties under the law
of the foreign country where the act was done. As an exception, a particular issue between
the parties may be governed by the law of the country which, with respect to that issue, has
the most significant relationship with the occurrence and the parties.
Such a rule combines the objectives of certainty and flexibility in the interest
of individual justice. Had it been applied in Grimes v. Cloutier and Cloutier,
the result would have been the same. The exception should be invoked only
in special circumstances where, after examination of the policy underlying the
law which may be applied and the interests of the parties to be affected, it is
clear that the lex loci delicti has no real connection with the proceedings, in order
to enable a plaintiff to recover damages available in the lexfori but not avail-
able in the lex loci delicti. This requirement should do much to alleviate any
fears that unacceptable uncertainty will be introduced in this area of the law.
In the case of interprovincial torts, the flexible exception should not be invoked
to avoid the application of the law of the province where the wrong occurred
especially when the residence of the parties or of the defendant is in that prov-
ince. To apply some other law, for instance, the lexfori as in Chaplin v. Boys
in the name of flexibility would not be conducive to uniform enforceability of
liability for torts occurring within Canada.
When Canadian residents travel from one province or territory to another
they are conscious of moving from one legal regime to another in the same coun-
try and that there may be differences between the two which will impinge in
some way on their rights, duties and liabilities. It may come as no surprise to
them to find that the local law governs their rights and liabilities in respect of
any wrong they did or any wrong they suffered in a province or territory. In these
circumstances, there is a stronger case for looking to the lex loci delicti as the
governing law for the purpose of determining the substantive rights and lia-
bilities of the parties in respect of a tort committed within Canada. In Grimes
v. Cloutier and Cloutier it was appropriate that the Ontario Court of Appeal
applied the law of Quebec exclusively. In a federation an individual should not
be exposed to the injustice of being subjected to the requirements of contem-
poraneously valid but inconsistent laws. In the absence of some relevant over-
riding territorial nexus, one province must not be able to attach legal liability
for conduct and consequences which are wholly within the territory of another
province, nor can it refuse to recognize or apply the substantive law of that other
province in relation to that conduct and its consequences. Interprovincial comity
requires such an attitude.3"
The decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal is wellcome. It is creative
within its limited scope but as the court itself remarked, :in Canada, the entire
subject of foreign torts should be "reconsidered from the ground up". 3' Let
30. See also W.A. Richardson, "The Rule in Phillips v. Eyre: The Road Not Taken" (1989), 31 C.P.C.
(2d) 65, at 81-82.
31. At 661.
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us express the pious hope that this call for reform will be answered soon.32
Until then, Machado v. Fontes continues to live on, even if it is limping more
and more!
32. In Prefontaine v. Frizzle, Cuddihey v. Robinson (1990), 71 O.R. (2d) 385, the Ontario Court of
Appeal extended the scope of Grimes v. Cloutier to bar a claim by Quebec plaintiffs against Ontario
resident defendants arising out of accidents in Quebec even though the defendants' acts infringed
the Quebec Highway Safety Code, S.Q. 1981, c. 7. The application of the Ontario law was not
within the reasonable expectations of the parties. The plaintiffs having received benefits under
Quebec law it would be unjust to compensate them again. To do so would also encourage forum
shopping. As for the relatives claiming under the Family LawAct, 1986, they could succeed only
if the victim had a right to maintain a claim in Ontario.
